Indigenous affairs policy. Expressing dissatisfaction with this discourse, it suggests a slightly more complex analytic way of thinking about Indigenous affairs involving three competing principles; equality, choice and guardianship. The paper suggests that dominant debates in Indigenous affairs balance these principles and move between them over time. Using a fourfold categorisation of ideological tendencies, it also suggests that different tendencies of thought about settler society and its relations with Indigenous societies occupy different positions in relation to the three competing principles. Finally, using the work of the Northern Territory Emergency Response Review Board as an example, the paper examines the role of evidence in Indigenous affairs. Evidence, it argues, always needs to be contextualised and is always a part of arguments or debates. The role of evidence in Indigenous affairs needs to be understood in relation to the much larger issue of balancing competing principles.
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Response, Ideology in Indigenous affairs. reviewed and slightly modified the NTER, and also begun putting its own stamp on Indigenous affairs policy more generally, 'ideology' and 'evidence' have continued to be prominent as major terms of opprobrium and praise respectively.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a slightly more complex analytic way of thinking about Indigenous affairs which begins with the idea of competing principles and only later raises the ideas of ideology and evidence. The paper begins by briefly documenting the recent rise to prominence of the ideology and evidence construction of Australian Indigenous affairs, including some contributions-at least in relation to ideology-from the prominent Cape York Aboriginal leader Noel Pearson. The paper then takes a step back from these recent events and identifies three competing principles which inform Australian Indigenous affairs policy in very different ways: equality, choice and guardianship. The third section of the paper suggests that at particular times in history the dominant debates in Australian Indigenous affairs have tended to emphasise one or two of these principles at the expense of another; but also that the limitations of each principle and the persistence of the others lead to an ongoing process of policy debate and readjustment. Reintroducing the term 'ideology' to the analysis, and developing some of Pearson's writings, the fourth section of the paper argues that there have indeed been swings in Australian Indigenous affairs over the years between Right and Left ideological tendencies, as is often claimed in the ideology and evidence construction. However, using a fourfold rather than a twofold categorisation of ideological tendencies, the paper suggests that each of the ideological tendencies sits closest to a particular principle and that Indigenous affairs always involves some genuinely difficult balancing of all three competing principles.
The fifth section of the paper turns to the role of evidence. By examining the work of the NTER Review Board, this section suggests how evidence in policy processes is always embedded in contexts and debates, which inevitably leads us back, in Indigenous affairs, to the three competing principles. The concluding remarks of the paper return to the writings of Noel Pearson and note that in his search for a radical centre in Australian Indigenous affairs, Pearson does not focus on evidence, but rather looks to dialectical tension between and synthesis of pairs of opposing principles. Although this is a somewhat different analytic schema sanders centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research to my own, Pearson and I seem to be agreeing that competing or opposing principles are at the heart of Indigenous affairs and that balancing or synthesising them requires conceptual argument and debate as much as evidence.
Ideology and evIdence dIscourse sInce 2006
Although Minister Brough was a willing user of the growing ideology and evidence discourse in Indigenous affairs during his twenty months as the head of the Commonwealth's Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs portfolio, it was in fact his Labor Opposition shadow ministerial counterpart, Senator Chris
Evans, who seemed to contribute more directly to establishing the prominence of these terms. On 10 March 2006, Evans delivered a speech entitled 'The End of Ideology in Australian Indigenous Affairs' . The shadow minister argued that in the past 'both major political parties' had 'pursued their ideological convictions in Indigenous policy to the detriment of Indigenous Australians' . The 'clash of political ideologies', he argued, had distracted 'focus from our respective policy failings' and 'ideologically driven policy' would 'continue to fail Indigenous Australians in the future' (Evans 2006: 1-2) . Predictably, Evans condemned the Howard Government's administrative re-arrangement of Indigenous affairs in 2005 as 'just the latest ideological experiment' which was also 'doomed to fail' . But perhaps more surprisingly, Evans also condemned his own party when he argued that:
Labor's ideological commitment to the rights agenda, self-determination and reconciliation was not matched by a successful attack on the fundamental causes of Indigenous disadvantage. We put too much faith in the capacity of the rights agenda to contribute to overcoming Indigenous disadvantage (Evans 2006: 3) .
In the future, Evans argued, Labor would 'look beyond our ideology and look to the evidence' . centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research dIscussIon paper n0. 289 3
we have the evidence that proves that reducing discretionary income and ensuring payments are directed to their intended purpose makes a real and positive impact on those we are seeking to assist. The question, therefore, is how do we achieve this more widely (Brough 2006: 2-3) .
While Brough indicated that he, personally, was ready to 'take the tough decisions and move to a system that requires certain welfare recipients to have part of their payments directed specifically to the benefit of their children', he also noted that his 'thoughts' that day were his 'own' and 'not Government policy' (Brough 2006: 3) . He would, however, be having 'discussions' with his 'colleagues' to ensure that 'welfare works for and not against, the most vulnerable' (Brough 2006: 3) .
Two and half weeks later on 15 May 2006, Indigenous affairs erupted into national attention. Nannette
Rogers, a central Australian crown prosecutor, gave details on the ABC's Lateline program of some horrific
Aboriginal child sexual abuse cases in which she had been professionally involved. In the debates which followed, the word 'ideology' was again to the fore as a term of opprobrium, though sometimes paired with some words other than 'evidence' as its laudatory opposite. Lingiari of 'revisiting an ideological approach that has failed' (Australia, HR 2006: 32) . Brough expressed his willingness to 'put the ideologies behind us' on the understanding that 'the two fundamentals' which needed to be dealt with were 'law and order and faith in our criminal justice system' (Australia, HR 2006: 36) . In further reply, Labor Member for Kingsford Smith in New South Wales, Peter Garrett, argued that:
Some of the differences that we have about ideology and approach should not blind us to the needs that Indigenous people have (Australia, HR 2006: 36) .
While Garrett agreed that 'law and order' needed to be addressed, he also urged attention to other 'underlying issues' as well, such as 'generations of governments' mistreatment and neglect' and looking at 'ways in which Indigenous people can meaningfully engage' with governments (Australia, HR 2006: 36) .
As it turned out, these were just the opening exchanges in a war of words in Australian Indigenous affairs which would continue for the next two years and beyond. One tribe comprising most indigenous leaders and possibly most indigenous people (but by no means an overwhelming majority) and their progressive supporters holds the view that the absence or insufficient realization of rights is the core of the indigenous predicament in our country.
The other tribe comprises most non-progressive, non-indigenous Australians and their conservative political leaders (including substantial numbers in the Labor Party) who hold the view that it is the absence of responsibilities that lies at the core of our people's malaise (Pearson 2007a ).
Pearson saw these two ideological tribes as 'insistent and deafly opposed camps', which helped explain why 'Indigenous policy is still at such a juvenile stage' in Australia (Pearson 2007a she was not interested in ideology, only outcomes, and that she has ordered her department to collect hard data on the progress of the intervention to provide information for a 12-month review (Karvelas & Kearney 2007) .
The same article reported Macklin as 'refusing to attack the Howard government's approach to indigenous affairs' and as indicating that 'radical policies' might be applied elsewhere 'provided they had been shown to work' .
In January 2008, after a meeting with the taskforce directing the intervention in the Northern Territory, Six months later, when appointing a Board to conduct a one year review of the NTER, Macklin directed the Board to:
1. Examine evidence and assess the overall progress of the NTER in the safety and wellbeing of children and laying the basis for a sustainable and better future for residents of remote communities in the Northern Territory (NT);
2. Consider what is and isn't working and whether the current suite of NTER measures will deliver the intended results, whether any unintended consequences have emerged and whether other measures should be developed; and 3. In relation to each NTER measure, make an assessment of its effect to date, and recommend any required changes to improve each measure and monitor performance (Macklin 2008b ).
Clearly the idea of evidence driving policy was well to the fore in these terms of reference for the NTER Review Board and this was reinforced in another media statement two weeks later in which Macklin related the appointment of this 'independent Review' to the Rudd Government's 'commitment to an evidencedbased approach to Indigenous policy' (Macklin 2008c) .
At the beginning of October 2008, when the NTER Review Board report was about to be submitted to the government, it was Prime Minister Rudd who reiterated the commitment to evidenced-based policy in Indigenous affairs and the condemnation of ideology:
You take it step by step, look at the evidence, what's working what's not and act accordingly.
We provided bipartisan support for this intervention in the first place. We said that against the objectives which have been set that we wanted to see the evidence in the first 12 months. Two weeks on, when the Review Board's report was finally submitted to the Commonwealth Government and made public, there was again much talk of evidence and its opposites. The Australian newspaper, in an editorial entitled 'Response Report Card', praised the government for its 'sober evidence-based assessment rather than an emotive and politically charged appraisal' . It argued that there was evidence that 'income management has put more food on the table and that an increased police presence in remote communities has enhanced a feeling of security', though 'broader aims … will take longer to quantify' (The Australian, 15 October 2008). By contrast however, Indigenous academic Professor Larissa Behrendt argued that the evidence was more that income quarantining 'causes hardship' and does not improve school attendance. A 'successful intervention', she argued, called for 'less emotion, more evidence' and a move away 'from failed ideological policies' (Behrendt, 2008) .
The three members of the NTER Review Board also highlighted the issue of evidence early in their report.
Under the heading 'Lack of evidentiary material', they argued that 'little or no baseline data existed against which to specifically evaluate the impacts of the NTER' and that this was 'a major problem' for them.
They recommended that a 'single integrated information system' be established by government to enable 'regular measurement of outcomes of all government agency programs and services that target Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory' (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16) . However, in line with their terms of reference, the Review Board did still proceed to make an 'assessment' of the seven 'key elements' of the NTER with the information that was available (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: passim) .
I will return to the report of the NTER Review Board and reactions to it in the later section of this paper focusing on evidence. For now, however, I wish to step back from current events and turn instead to the idea of competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs.
competIng prIncIples: equalIty, choIce and guardIanshIp
The simple dichotomising of ideology as bad and evidence as good in Australian Indigenous affairs is, to me, somewhat inadequate as an analytic schema. My suggestion for a slightly more complex schema to make sense of Indigenous affairs begins with the idea of three competing principles. It then moves on to how dominant debates, persistent ideas and ideological tendencies relate to these principles over time, before turning to the issue of evidence.
The dominant principle which sits at the top and centre of Australian Indigenous affairs is equality-the idea that in some important way Indigenous Australians ought to be equal to settler Australians. As soon as the equality principle is stated, however, questions arise about the way, or ways, in which it is important for Indigenous and other Australians to be equal, and about how any tension between different ways of being equal might be resolved. Writing a decade ago, Scott Bennett identified five possible 'measures' of equality, or inequality, that were worthy of attention in Australian Indigenous affairs: legal equality, political equality, economic equality, equality of opportunity and equal satisfaction of basic needs (Bennett 1999: 2) . In my centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research dIscussIon paper n0. 289 7
analytic schema I make do with just three types of equality, which I think cover most of the same ground:
legal equality, socioeconomic equality and equality of opportunity.
2
Many debates in Australian Indigenous affairs are about whether legal equality or socioeconomic equality between Indigenous and settler Australians is more important and should therefore be the focus of policy attention. Both positions have attractions, but both also have problems. Legal equality seems simple and fair, but can also be seen as inadequate recognition of the distinctive historical and cultural origins of Indigenous people and of their contemporary disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances. The push towards socioeconomic equality, on the other hand, seems to address disadvantage but can also look like a somewhat insensitive attempt to eradicate social, historical and cultural distinctiveness along with socioeconomic disadvantage. Often the way to resolve these problems, philosophically, is to move to an idea of equality of opportunity. But this too has problems: how can we know when equality of opportunity exists? Nevertheless, it is this idea of equality of opportunity that I put absolutely at the top and centre of my analytic schema
of Indigenous affairs, with the ideas of legal equality and socioeconomic equality slightly off to the left and right respectively (see Fig. 1 ).
The alternative to equality, specified affirmatively, is difference and diversity. As in other fields of social analysis, in Indigenous affairs difference and diversity can be seen both positively and negatively. If seen positively, as an indicator of informed Indigenous agency at either the group or individual level, difference Fig. 1 ).
The principle of guardianship enters public policy when, for one reason or another, governments believe that particular people within their jurisdictions are not competent judges of their own best interests; and that neither are their close relatives and associates who, in the absence of government intervention, would normally take on the role of guardian of an incompetent person's interests. The most common invocation of the guardianship principle in public policy is in relation to children who have either lost their parents, or whose parents are deemed at a particular point in time to be unfit judges of their child's best interests.
But the principle is also invoked in relation to the mentally disturbed, the disabled and the infirm aged, among others. In relation to Indigenous people, the guardianship principle can clearly be invoked in all these particular individual circumstances. However it can also be invoked in relation to larger numbers or whole groups of Indigenous people because of a worry that the relationship between large-scale, settler industrial society and small-scale Indigenous societies is unequal, unjust and in some way predatory or exploitative.
Indigenous people as whole groups can be judged as vulnerable to the encroaching power of settler industrial society, or parts thereof, and as not therefore competent judges of their own best interests.
These three competing principles of equality, choice and guardianship can clearly push Indigenous affairs policy in some quite contrasting directions. Indigenous people are at one level invited to be equal to settler
Australians, while at the same time being given license to be different, so long as that difference is the result of responsible Indigenous agency and choice, at either the group or individual level. However, if difference is seen by governments as being the result of irresponsible Indigenous agency, or of an exploitative or predatory relationship with parts of settler society, then the third competing principle of guardianship will be invoked. This triangular relationship between competing principles is represented in Fig. 1 , with equality at the top and centre, and choice and guardianship somewhat lower down and off to the left and right respectively.
domInant deBates and persIstent Ideas In IndIgenous affaIrs hIstory
In the previous section, I have deliberately set out the three competing principles of Indigenous affairs policy as an analytic schema without historical referents. I have also used terms which are somewhat different from those employed in many conventional accounts of Australian Indigenous affairs policy history. My intention, in doing so, is to separate the analytic schema from the history of Australian Indigenous affairs debates over centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research dIscussIon paper n0. 289 9 time. But having established the basic analytic schema, I think it is important to relate it to policy history, at least of the twentieth century.
The conventional way to tell Australian Indigenous affairs policy history of the twentieth century has been in three parts, or periods, with the key terms attached to the consecutive thirds of the century being protection, assimilation and self-determination. Protection clearly relates to the principle of guardianship, and there is I think some truth in arguing that during the first third of the twentieth century up to the 1930s, the dominant debates in Australian Indigenous affairs tended towards an emphasis on the guardianship principle, particularly in relation to Indigenous people in more remote areas who were still coming into (Pearson 2007d) . This seems to be rediscovering the idea of vulnerable people who cannot presently judge their own best interests, and hence the guardianship principle in Australian Indigenous affairs.
While Pearson sees this recent shift in Indigenous affairs policy as a move to the Right after 30 years of domination by the Left, he also sees himself and a few others as trying to discover a radical policy centre rather than just being a part of this move to the Right. While I agree with Pearson's analysis on both these points, I want to note a couple of things which emerge from my plotting of this latest shift in the dominant debates of Australian Indigenous affairs onto my analytic schema of competing principles in Fig. 2 . The first is that this is a swing back to the Right, which generally predominated in Australian Indigenous affairs before the 1960s. The second is that this swing back to the Right has not occurred at the same place as the shift away 40 years ago. Rather than ending up back at the equal legal rights position of the 1960s at the top of my analytic triangle, the debate has in fact rediscovered the ideas of negative difference, vulnerability, protection and guardianship at the bottom of the analytic triangle. These are the ideas and principles which were more prevalent in Australian Indigenous affairs in the first third of the twentieth century.
That this shift back to the Right in Australian Indigenous affairs has occurred at the bottom of the analytic triangle is, I think, important. It suggests that even when particular debates and principles become dominant in Australian Indigenous affairs, the overlooked principles never entirely disappear. The guardianship principle is, in many ways, a persistent idea in Australian Indigenous policy, which was moved away from for 60 or 70 years, first in the name of equal rights and citizenship and then in the name of Indigenous rights and choice. The guardianship principle was almost entirely lost from view in the self-determination era, only to be rediscovered very quickly in the early 2000s. Something similar could also be said, in reverse, of the idea of self-determination, choice and positive cultural difference, which one Aboriginal historian has recently reminded us was still present in 1920s Aboriginal activism even though often overlooked (Maynard 2005) .
So even when dominant debates appear to have almost forgotten one of these three competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs, there is a sense in which they still continue to be present as a persistent idea which never entirely goes away. While dominant debates in Indigenous affairs do move over time in favour of one or two of the three competing principles over others, there is another sense in which Indigenous affairs is always and at all times a balancing, and re-balancing, of all three of these competing principles. With two such unflattering portraits of the Left and Right ideological tendencies, it was, perhaps, to be anticipated that Pearson would argue for the clear superiority of his own preferred search for a 'radical centre' in Australian Indigenous affairs.
To understand Australian Indigenous affairs a little more deeply, I suggest we need to start with some more sympathetic, or at least neutral analytic views of ideological tendencies in Australian society. These need to focus in the first instance on attitudes towards settler society and only secondarily on attitudes towards Indigenous society and affairs. I also want to suggest the need for a fourfold categorisation of ideological tendencies, based on a distinction between their economic and social dimensions.
In the economic dimension, the Right are the defenders of and believers in modern, large-scale industrial, primarily market-based society. They see the expansion of industrial society as progress towards the good society. To the extent that they defend an economic form which already predominates in the modern world, they are appropriately labelled economic conservatives. The Left, on other hand, are and have long been the critics and sceptics of modern, large-scale industrial, market-based society. They are not so sure that capitalist industrial expansion is progress towards the good society and they look for other possible images of what progress and the good society might be. One such image, which is now somewhat discredited, is modern, large-scale industrial socialism or communism. But other images of progress and the good society on the Left often look more to smaller scale societies which are not quite so industrial or competitive and market-based in their nature. Hence the Left in Australia has some fascination with Indigenous huntergatherer society as a smaller scale, less industrial economic system; whereas the Right has less interest in the Indigenous economic system, seeing it as backwards in comparison to modern industrial production.
In the social dimension, the basic question which ideological tendencies address is whether the social behaviour of various groups and individuals ought to be respected as of their own responsible informed choosing, or whether such behaviour needs to be more externally directed in the pursuit of some good not yet fully appreciated and taken into account by the group in question. The basic divide which emerges is centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research dIscussIon paper n0. 289 13 between, what I call, the socially directive and the socially liberal and it is possible for both these tendencies to be combined with the economic tendencies towards enthusiasm for and scepticism of the goodness of large-scale industrial society.
This separation of social and economic dimensions produces the four ideological tendencies identified in Fig. 3 as socially directive enthusiasts for industrial society, socially liberal enthusiasts for industrial society, socially directive sceptics of industrial society and social liberal sceptics of industrial society. As these are somewhat long labels, I reduce them by applying the words Right and Left to the economic dimension and the words directive and liberal to the social dimension, producing the labels directive Right, liberal Right, directive Left and liberal Left. 4 My contention is that each of these four ideological tendencies sits in a somewhat different position around the triangular analytic schema of competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs and that each has historically also had times of greater and lesser influence in the dominant debates of Australian Indigenous affairs.
The socially directive enthusiasts for industrial society, or directive Right, sit closest to the guardianship principle and had their greatest influence in Australian Indigenous affairs policy in the 1930s and before. This more complex fourfold description of ideological tendencies would also seem to suggest that the entry of ideologies into Indigenous affairs policy debates is, in some sense, inevitable rather than avoidable. Can actors be neutral about their judgments of the goodness of modern large-scale industrial economic processes in comparison to remnant hunter-gatherer production, and about social directiveness and liberalism? And if they could, would they be useful participants in policy debates? Ideological tendencies, in this more analytic sense of large underlying ideas about the nature of society and economy, would seem almost a prerequisite for contributing to Indigenous affairs policy debates, rather than something to be avoided as a bad influence. Ideology, thus understood, is fundamental to making a contribution to policy, rather than something which is bad and either can or should be avoided.
What role evIdence?
What then is the role of evidence in Australian Indigenous affairs? I want to approach this final question by returning to the Report of the NTER Review Board, published in October 2008, and reactions to it. You will recall that the terms of reference asked the Review Board to 'examine evidence and assess the overall progress sanders centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research of the NTER' and 'in relation to each NTER measure, make an assessment of its effects to date' (Macklin 2008b ; also Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 66) . You will also recall that early in their report the Review Board noted the lack of 'baseline data to specifically evaluate the impacts of the NTER' and that this was 'a major problem' for them (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16) . So how did a Review Board proceed which was charged with looking at the evidence, but which judged early on that there was a 'lack of evidentiary material'? (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16) . And what does this tell us about the nature of evidence in Australian Indigenous affairs, and possibly also in policy processes more generally?
The Review Board report began by stating that it:
placed primary importance on establishing face-to-face dialogue with Aboriginal people and encouraging them to put forward their views on the NTER and its impact on their lives -both good and bad (Yu, Duncan and Gray 2008: 16) .
The Board told of their meetings with representatives of 56 communities and 140 organisations. They recounted seeking 'public submissions' (they received over 200) and meeting with 'relevant Commonwealth and Northern Territory agencies' who provided 'background briefing material', plus some 'data and specific information requested by the Board' (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16) . The Review Board also noted that they convened three meetings of an Expert Group, the 11 members of which 'generously provided their expertise and advice in response to the Board's requests' (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 16) . On the basis of these four sources of information the Review Board proceeded to make an assessment of each of the seven intervention measures in terms of:
their impact on the local communities, the strengths and weaknesses of the initiatives and whether government should consider alternatives in pursuit of its objectives to improve the protection of children and advance the wellbeing of Aboriginal families and communities in the Northern Territory (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 20) .
Chapter 2 of the Review Board's report examined, in turn, each of the seven 'measures' within the NTER, and their various 'sub-measures' . This chapter of the report is predominantly negative in tone, citing numerous instances in which submissions and community meetings had adverse and critical things to say about the measures and a minority of instances in which more positive comments were made. Chapter 2 is also notable for its primarily anecdotal tone, citing lots of what people said in submissions and meetings, while being very cautious about the few available sources of statistics, as I will discuss further shortly. My third general observation is that, in the terms of a useful schema recently elaborated by Head, virtually all the information used by the Review Board to assess the NTER was 'practical implementation knowledge', rather than 'scientific (research-based) knowledge' (Head 2008) : i.e. knowledge generated in the processes of service delivery by providers and consumers, rather than knowledge generated by research processes. 6 This may reflect the short-time scales of both the NTER and the Review Board's work, but I would suggest that it is in fact the normal situation in Indigenous affairs policy processes. Head's third form of knowledge in evidenced-based policy processes, 'political knowledge', would also seem indispensable. Without working through all that was centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research dIscussIon paper n0. 289 17 said on all measures and sub-measures in Chapter 2 of the NTER Review Board report, I will try to give some sense of its style in relation to two or three sub-measures.
On 'income management', the 'most widely recognized measure' of the NTER, the Review Board reported 'competing views' about its 'direct and profound impact on the lives of over 13,300 individuals' subject to it by 30 June 2008. They reported 'widespread disillusionment, resentment and anger in a significant segment of the Indigenous community' about the 'blanket imposition of compulsory income management' in prescribed areas and the lack of any 'opportunity' for people who 'responsibly manage their income' to 'negotiate' the arrangement. The Board also reported 'confusion and anxiety' arising from the requirement 'to master new, complex and often changing procedures with a minimum of information and explanation', leading to complaints to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and 'difficulties associated with acquiring and using store cards' as part of income management (Yu, Duncan and Gray 2008: 20) . On the more positive side, the Review Board noted that 'many Aboriginal people, especially women, along with the observations of local clinicians, school teachers and storekeepers' supported income management and felt that it had 'benefited' people by enabling them to 'avoid or limit "humbugging"' and to 'manage their income and family budgets' in ways 'which they had not done previously' (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 21) . Reflecting this more positive experience, the Review Board recommended (2008: 23):
income management be available on a voluntary basis to community members who choose to have some of their income quarantined for specific purposes, as determined by them.
However, reflecting the more negative comments it also recommended that the 'current blanket application of compulsory income management' in prescribed areas should 'cease' and be replaced by a compulsory scheme which 'should only apply on the basis of child protection, school enrolment and attendance and other relevant behavioural triggers', but which would apply 'across the Northern Territory' rather than just in prescribed areas (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 23) .
On the 'alcohol and drugs' sub-measures within the 'law and order' measure, the Review Board noted (2008: 24):
Numerous submissions report that large numbers of people have continued to drink outside the prescribed areas.
There was also, they argued (2008: 24):
anecdotal evidence that the Commonwealth declaration of prescribed communities has resulted in drinking camps shifting further away from community boundaries (as the prescribed areas are larger than the communities themselves).
Some communities, they continued, welcomed 'the resulting reduction in noise and anti-social behaviour' . not convinced there is any evidence to indicate that the NTER requirement for a person to show identification when buying $100 or more of takeaway alcohol is effective or capable of being monitored in a way that enables action to be taken .
They thought it 'unclear' how this sub-measure was 'intended to achieve a result' and suggested that a 'more workable alternative to achieve the results originally intended' might be given consideration (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 25) .
On the policing sub-measures, the Board reported that '18 additional temporary police stations' had been built and 'an additional 51 police' deployed. The general tone of the report on this sub-measure was also more positive (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 25) : The Review Board treated these statistics with great caution and confined them to an appendix. In the body of their report they simply stated that 'expert advice to the Board' suggested that it was 'too early to draw any significant conclusions from this data' and that all it really showed was (2008: 26):
that a police station is now operating and that crime in being reported -it does not provide a measure of the actual level of crime before and after the establishment of the station.
This example of the police statistics is, I think, worth dwelling on, as it is often just this sort of hard, quantitative data that advocates of evidenced-based policy seek. However, when they obtain such data they often realise that, of itself, it doesn't actually tell them very much. The data, or evidence, needs to be interpreted in relation to a context and an argument, rather than simply standing alone as an indicator of what works or doesn't work. In this instance, where police numbers had just gone up, an increase in the level of reported and detected crime was seen as good evidence of at least getting police systems up and running in communities. However in a few years time when police numbers are more stable, the evidence being looked for as an indicator of success will more likely be a decrease in crimes detected and reported. They then recounted hearing of:
recent examples of attempts to report abuse or neglect to child protection authorities where there was no effective response (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 34) .
So the statistics were again interpreted in a way which suggested a context of just establishing a service delivery system and as a result expecting increases in numbers of reports and cases, even though reforms in child protection had supposedly been occurring for several years.
These examples of the rather tentative use of statistics in the NTER Review Board Report suggests that evidence in policy processes is, as Majone argued twenty years ago, just a small part of a much larger process of argument and persuasion. Evidence, Majone (1989: 48) argued, is:
information selected from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in an argument 'to persuade the mind that a given factual proposition is true or false' .
The effectiveness of evidence can, he noted, be destroyed by:
an inappropriate choice of data, their placement at a wrong point in the argument, (or) a style of presentation that is unsuitable for the audience to which the argument is directed (Majone 1989: 48) .
So, with any contribution to a policy process, it may be as important to focus on the arguments being made, and to whom, as on the specific piece of data or evidence being used. What were the arguments of NTER Review Board, and who were they trying to persuade of what?
Despite all the negative and critical commentary drawn from their various information sources, the Report of the NTER Review Board argued strongly in favour of the continuation of the intervention, though with some changes towards a more participatory and consultative approach. 7 The three paragraphs which best captured this tone of argument, and its qualification, occurred towards the end of the report's 'executive summary':
The situation in remote communities and town camps was-and remains-sufficiently acute to be described as a national emergency. The NTER should continue.
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There is a need for a bipartisan commitment to a sustained national effort, and a sustained commitment of the funds necessary, to provide Aboriginal children and families in these communities with a level of safety and wellbeing comparable to any other Australian community.
The single most valuable resource that the NTER has lacked from its inception is the positive, willing participation of the people it was intended to help. The most essential element in moving forward is for government to re-engage with the Aboriginal people of the Northern Territory (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 10-11 ).
These three paragraphs captured quite succinctly the way in which argument in Australian Indigenous affairs is always balancing the three competing principles of my analytic schema. In the middle paragraph we see the dominant equality principle, in the form of a claim that 'Aboriginal children and families in these communities' ought to have 'a level of safety and wellbeing comparable to other Australian communities' .
In the third paragraph we see the reference to Aboriginal agency and choice, in the form of 'the positive, willing participation of the people it was intended to help'; which the Review Board sees the NTER as having 'lacked from its inception' but requiring if it is to move 'forward' . In the first paragraph, we find an agreement with the fundamental contention that the situation in these Aboriginal communities is sufficiently bad to justify the language of national emergency, and this will inevitably lead to at least some external definition of people's interests and an invoking of the guardianship principle.
While paying due respect to all three competing principles in their argumentative process, the Review Board was, it seems to me, also trying to resist somewhat the recent headlong rush towards re-emphasising the The second was to base the 'relationship with Aboriginal people' on 'genuine consultation, engagement and partnership' . The third was to make 'government actions' conform with the Racial Discrimination Act (Yu, Duncan & Gray 2008: 12) . But were the Board's arguments and recommendations persuasive to the minister and government to whom they were directed?
On 23 'demonstrated benefit for women and children' . Because of this the 'current stabilisation phase of the NTER' would continue 'for the next twelve months' before transition to a 'long-term' phase which would not rely on the 'suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act' (Macklin 2008d) . However, even in this longer term phase, it appeared, compulsory income management would probably continue:
The government is strongly committed to compulsory income management as a tool to reduce alcohol-related violence, protect children, guard against humbugging and promote personal responsibility.
The existing comprehensive compulsory income management measures are yielding vital benefits to Indigenous communities and many Indigenous people want them to continue (Macklin 2008d ).
While the term 'evidence' was not used in this written government statement, it came to the fore when Macklin elaborated verbally. In a television interview later in the day, the opening question focused on the evidence to support compulsory income management and Macklin answered as follows:
The best evidence I have available to me is twofold: one coming from some excellent evidence that's been collected from the stores showing that there's been a significant increase in the purchase of fresh fruit and vegetables, increased purchases of fresh meat, we are also seeing some of the children putting on weight, income management has also allowed people to save for whitegoods, there's been a reduction in the consumption of cigarettes and alcohol, so there's some direct evidence.
Some of the more anecdotal evidence is really coming from particularly all of the women that I have spoken to in many, many communities, some of whom I'd have to say have pleaded with me to keep compulsory income management (7.30 Report, 23 October 2008).
Macklin's argument put a more positive interpretation on the practice-based evidence surrounding compulsory income management than the NTER Review Board. In terms of my analytic schema, Macklin seemed to be defending the guardianship aspects of compulsory income management not only with evidence derived from practitioner third parties, like the store keepers, but also from people subject to the measure themselves. This latter is, of course, highly prized evidence for those who invoke the guardianship principle in policy processes. When parties subject to an external definition of their interests quickly adopt that definition as their own, then the invoking of the guardianship principle seems well justified, as well as consistent with a more informed exercise of choice. As Macklin put it in response to the next interview question, the government wanted 'to see the development of strong social norms in these communities'
and, as far as she was concerned, there was 'very strong evidence that it's coming from compulsory income management ' (7.30 Report, 23 October 2008) .
So evidence could be found and woven into both sides of this argument about compulsory income management, which was in my analytic schema a struggle between the choice and guardianship principles.
Evidence did not stand alone as demonstrating what worked. It had to be contextualised, interpreted and sanders centre for aBorIgInal economIc polIcy research inserted at appropriate points in arguments between the competing principles of guardianship and choice and the ideological tendencies towards social liberalism and directiveness.
the radIcal centre and evIdence: some concludIng remarKs
In conclusion I want to return to Pearson's idea of the radical centre in Australian Indigenous affairs and to how it relates to the idea of evidence.
Pearson's account of the radical centre does not focus on evidence at all. Rather he talks about this centre being a point of high 'dialectical tension' between 'opposing principles' where 'policy positions' are 'much closer and more carefully calibrated than most people imagine' (Pearson 2007c: 25) . Pearson identifies ten dichotomous sets of 'classic dialectical tensions in human policy', but confines his discussion in the context of Indigenous affairs to just five: social order versus liberty or freedom, idealism versus realism or pragmatism, structure versus behaviour, opportunity versus choice and, finally, rights versus responsibility. Pearson (2007c: 29) argues that the:
resolution of each of these tensions lies in their dialectical synthesis, and not through the absolute triumph of one side of a struggle or a weak compromise.
He also argues (2007c: 29) that 'complexity arises because questions of human policy ... involve a number of tensions simultaneously', rather than being neatly confined to the 'isolated categories of a ten-point list' .
While this is a somewhat different construction of competing principles in Australian Indigenous affairs to my own, it does seem that Pearson and I agree in general on the importance of opposing or competing principles, and the way in which they are forever being balanced and synthesised rather than definitively resolved in Australian Indigenous affairs. Evidence in Indigenous affairs plays just a small role in a much larger argumentative struggle, not only between competing principles but also between different, largely unavoidable, ideological tendencies. Australian Indigenous affairs needs to transcend the simple dichotomy of evidence being good and ideology being bad. The idea of competing principles, however schematised, is a far more powerful analytic device.
